On this day, 31 May 1950, Robert Menzies announces that Australia would be sending an RAAF squadron of Dakota transport aircraft to Malaya. This represented the first military commitment made by the newly elected Coalition Government, and also the first step in what proved to be a wider strategy by Australia to lend military support to halt the spread of communism in the Asia-Pacific region. In the ensuing conflict 39 Australian combat personnel would lose their lives in Malaya, though only 15 of these as a direct result of military operations.

The Malayan Emergency was the product of political destabilisation which dogged the Asia-Pacific region in the aftermath of the Second World War, as Japanese troops withdrew from what had previously been European-dominated colonies. While the Netherlands and France would engage in bloody conflicts in an attempt to reimpose their control of lost territories, Britain succeeded in regaining control of the Malay Peninsula which had been occupied by the Japanese, and the British Government opted to form a new unified country of ‘Malaya’ out of the various small and fractured states that had previously occupied the landmass.

When the British announced the Malay Union proposals in 1946, they promised to grant full citizenship to the large minority of ethnically Chinese residents of the new country. However, backlash from the wider Malay population saw the British back down from their promise – resulting in understandable anger amongst the Chinese population. In the circumstances of the early Cold War and communist success in the Chinese Civil War, this anger was funnelled into the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and what became an insurrection against the government of what was now dubbed the Federation of Malaya.

On 16 June 1948 three British estate managers in northern Malaya were assassinated by MCP guerrillas and by 18 June, the British had declared a ‘state of emergency over the whole of Malaya’. British, Ghurka and Malayan military personnel and police subsequently began operations against Communist insurgents, and a conflict between the two sides would wage until 1960.

In April 1950 the British Government asked the Australian Government for RAAF assistance in the conflict, but Menzies was hesitant to agree to the request because he feared that the electorate would not approve of ‘committing Australia to a militaristic policy’. This followed the line of the recently-ousted Chifley Government, which had resisted giving military aid to Malaya partly because it held the belief that Asian communist parties were often entangled with nationalist movements and therefore could not be opposed in the straightforward manner adopted against the further spread of the iron curtain in Europe.

Menzies eventually accepted the request after a visit to Australia by British Commissioner-General for South-East Asia Malcolm MacDonald, but in keeping the Australian commitment to a supportive transport role the Prime Minister continued to act with a high level of caution. Menzies justified the decision in Parliament on the basis of regional proximity and the domino theory:

‘Malaya is a key point in the strategic region, of which Australia is a main support area. Apart from the role which Australia may take as a member of the British Commonwealth in co-operation in mutual defence, it is fundamental to our security that the situation in Malaya, which has been brought about by the foreign-sponsored Fifth Column, should be cleared up as soon as possible…Events in Malaya are, of course, part of the global pattern of imperialistic Communist aggression, and must be seen in a world context. The ultimate objective of the Soviet leaders is, and always has been, world Communism under their control.’

It was the outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950, and its clear act of aggression and expansionism on the part of a communist government in Asia, which changed the Australian Government’s and indeed the Australian public’s attitude towards one of clearer support for giving military aid. Australia’s commitment to Malaya escalated gradually, first with the addition of bombers in the aftermath of the Korea development, and then more significantly with the commitment of ground troops in 1955.

The later came after the peak of hostilities, when British Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs and his successor General Sir Gerald Templer had implemented innovative tactics, including building new villages to win over the support of the impoverished Chinese population, to turn the tide of the conflict. Australian troops performed what the official history dubbed ‘a long, frustrating and occasionally bloody clean-up operation’, concluding what remains one of the few examples of Western powers succeeding in implementing a counter insurgency operation.

Though Australians would lose their lives defending Malaya from the threat of communism, the cautious and contained commitment, and the ultimate success of the operation stand in clear contrast to Australia’s later commitment to the Vietnam War. Indeed, Military Historian Peter Edwards has argued that the Malayan Emergency represented the Menzies Government successfully implementing a strategy of ‘forward defence’ in a manner that it would fail to do when it rushed into Vietnam under the same logic. Key differences were patience, knowledge of local conditions, and Australia having a more cooperative and discerning relationship with British military planners than it did with those of the United States. He concludes that:

‘The Malayan Emergency proved to be an important test of Australian statecraft in the post-1945 era. Australian political, diplomatic and military leaders worked hard to secure their strategic goals, engaging effectively with both their principal ally and the local nationalists. When Malaya gained its independence in 1957, the new government, elected with clear popular support, invited the Australians and other Commonwealth forces to stay and to continue their anti-terrorist operations. They were also asked to remain in the region after the emergency was finally declared over in 1960.’

Further Reading:

David Watt, ‘The 70th anniversary of the Malayan Emergency: a quick guide’, Australian Parliamentary Library Research Paper, The 70th anniversary of the Malayan Emergency: a quick guide (aph.gov.au)

J. Grey & P. Dennis, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian military operations in Malaya and Borneo, 1950–1966, volume 5 of The official history of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts, 1948–1975 (Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1996).

Peter Edwards, ‘Learning from History: Some strategic lessons from the forward defence era’, ASPI Paper, 2015, Learning from history: some strategic lessons from the ‘forward defence’ era (amazonaws.com)